Strategic Exchange-Rate Policy of Accession Countries in ERM II

Exchange-rate policies of Central Eastern European Countries (CEEC) have often been a subject matter. Yet, some new insights in terms of political economy considerations upon exchange-rate policy are provided. It is pointed out that it is more appropriate to analyse exchange-rate policy in course of Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II) with regard to a changing incentive structure. In doing so, considerable moral hazard problems become apparent. ERM II shall provide for an adequate level of convergence between prospective and current members of European Monetary Union (EMU). However, this institutional arrangement and, particularly, its impact on the incentives for exchange-rate policy making might enable CEEC to load considerable costs of convergence onto current members. Accordingly, the phase of ERM II is considered to be a bargaining on the distribution of costs of convergence between prospective and current members of EMU. In return, accession countries would offer to maintain public support for European integration. The CEEC’ leverage in this bargaining rests on brinkmanship, i.e. putting exchange-rate regimes at risk, thus possibly undermining the according public support. This paper delineates the basic assumptions and conditions for successful brinkmanship, points out the specific transmission mechanisms, and characterises this kind of exchange-rate policy as ‘threaten-thy-neighbour’. Overall analysis results in a cautious outlook on probable effects of such strategic exchange-rate policies on European institutional and economic matters.brinkmanship, exchange-rate policy

A Way to Solve the Euro pean Balance of Payments Crisis? Take a Chance on Market Solutions!

Schulden; Finanzmarktkrise; Schuldenkrise; Europäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion

The Bail-Out! Positive Political Economics of Greek-type Crises in the EMU

The Greek bail-out was highly controversial. An oft-heard assessment is that i) the bail-out was a mistake, ii) the political haggling over it was irrational and iii) the bail-out will create a moral hazard problem. Contrary to this view, our analysis suggests that, given EMU’s present political-economic set-up, i) the bail-out was unavoidable, ii) the lengthy process of political haggling leading to it was understandable, and iii) the bail-out does not have to be necessarily associated with a future moral hazard problem. Based on our analysis, we suggest that the EMU’s institutional design could be improved by establishing ‘exit rules’ and that bail-outs should be made rule-based. We have based our analysis on a political-economic, game-theoretic model that helps to understand why and how the parties involved in the Greek crisis arrived at the bail-out and on what conditions the final solution depended. The model allows tracing analytically the dynamics of the negotiation processes as well as the conditions and parameters on which the scope and limits of fiscal redistribution in EMU depends. In doing so, we formally take account of the ‘negative externality’ problem that has been central to policy debates related to the EMU’s institutional design and has played an important role in the Greek crisis. However, contrary to the existing literature, we do not only focus on the economic aspects of such negative externality, but also look at where they emanate from and interact with political factors, in particular the dynamics of the political negotiation process within the EMU.Greek crisis, bail-out, negative externality, political economics, game theory, euro, EMU

EMU-enlargement and the Reshaping of Decision-making within the ECB Governing Council: A Voting-Power Analysis

The monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) is the subject matter of this paper. We analyze the prospects for future price stability in an enlarged European Monetary and Economic Union (EMU). At the heart of this study are the potential e®ects of altering decision-making procedure within the Governing Council of the ECB on price stability in the eurozone. The authors compare the impact of three alternative reform scenarios of the ECB Governing Council with the help of a voting-power analysis. It is presumed that a considerable loss of current EMU-members’ influence power especially in favour of joining Central Eastern European Countries (CEECs) results in a loss of monetary credibility of the ECB: As transparency of the decision-making process within the ECB is lacking, markets may consider the ECB to be too much inclined to the economic performances of the CEECs. This has then a negative impact on the level of price stability in Europe. The voting-power analysis indicates which reform proposal is best with respect to a price-stability benchmark.

Ein Lösungsweg für die europäische Zahlungsbilanzkrise? Mehr Markt wagen!

Zahlungsbilanz, Zahlungsbilanzungleichgewicht, Schulden, Leistungsbilanz, Wettbewerb, Europäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion

New Risks Ahead:The Eastward Enlargement of the Eurozone

Eastward enlargement is one of the hot topics in European economics. The accession of central and eastern European Countries (CEEC) into the European Union (EU) is accompanied by an extension of the eurozone to this region. This paper surveys likely outcomes and challenges of this specific feature of EU enlargement. Moreover, the ar-ticle represents the start of an international research project dealing with these ques-tions. Research is structured along different markets. Hence, the impact of an adoption of the euro is analysed for capital and labour markets as well as with respect to exchange rate and monetary policies. Our main position is that the euro has in general beneficiary ef-fects for the CEEC and the current EU in all examined markets. However, these bene-fits evolve mainly in the long run, whereas the short-term costs of adaptation to the new situation may be high. Although we believe that the present value of long-term benefits exceeds these costs, it is by no means clear that policy-makers will share this view. Due to the usual political-economy transformation, the assessment of costs and benefits may be different for politicians than compared to any overall perspective. If of-ficial policies become unforeseeable, so will private behaviour. International investors may reverse their capital flows, draining precious liquidity, and leading to currency and financial crises whenever they perceive the authorities’ commitment to EMU less credi-ble. This article highlights some thinkable mechanisms how any such crisis could evolve. It, thus, sets the agenda for further research, mainly, with the focus on appropriate policy strategies to keep adaptation costs as low as possible, minimise other external risks, without hampering the long-term benefits.EMU, EU enlargement, monetary integration

EU-Rettungsschirm: Folgt der Einstieg in eine Transferunion?

Setzt der im letzten Jahr ins Leben gerufene Euro-Rettungsschirm wesentliche Grundprinzipien des Maastricht-Vertrags außer Kraft? Folgt der Einstieg in eine Transferunion?